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ABSTRACT 
 
REGIONALISM AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT: A COMPARATIVE 
CASE STUDY OF TRANSPORT DEVELOPMENT IN EAC (EAST AFRICAN 
COMMUNITY) AND GMS (GREATER MEKONG SUBREGION) 
 
By 
 
Seon Ho Moon 
 
 
Improving connectivity through cross-border infrastructures plays a vital role in 
development. However, such cross-border infrastructures are largely undersupplied, 
especially in developing economies, as they are regional public goods (RPGs) that confront 
coordination failures among national governments. While appropriate interventions are 
necessary for optimal provision of RPGs, in the absence of supranational authority 
(‘anarchy’), such a role for regional cooperation is carried out by different regional actors and 
through different institutions (rules of the game). In the East African Community (EAC), 
regional cooperation for development is dominantly led by Kenya, a regional hegemon, while 
in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), the process is essentially led by the support of the 
ADB. Both regional communities desperately strive to achieve economic development 
through high quality infrastructure and facilitation of trade. By scrutinizing the two selected 
regional communities, this paper aims to reveal the drivers behind the emergence of 
regionalism in the two regions and how they affect the dynamics of the provision of transport 
infrastructure. It will also seek for their implications for trade and economic development. In 
the course of analysis, international relations theories, political economy analysis (PEA), and 
descriptive statistics will be used to compare the two regions. The paper finds that due to 
absence of an effective coordinator and fragmented implementation of regional transport 
policies, balanced infrastructure development and growth in intra-regional trade have been 
relatively less successful in the EAC than in the GMS. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Improving connectivity through high-quality infrastructure is crucial for development 
as it generates large welfare gains through increased market access, reduced trade costs, and 
more efficient allocation of resources (ADB 2009, 4). Numerous studies attest that 
infrastructure plays a significant role in promoting and sustaining rapid economic growth as 
well as alleviating poverty (Hulten 1996; Esfahani and Ramirez 2003; Estache 2005; 
Rickards 2008; Datt and Ravallion 1998; and Fan and Zhang 2004). There is also ample 
evidence suggesting that returns on infrastructure investment often greatly exceed those from 
other forms of capital investment (ADB 2009, 7).  
 Such large economic benefits can also be enjoyed internationally with the 
development of cross-border infrastructures1 such as transport corridors, ports, and railways. 
Cross-border infrastructures enhance regional connectivity and promote regional integration 
by reducing transportation costs which in turn affect the trade volume of the region (Francois 
and Manchin 2013; Limao and Venables 2001; Shepherd and Wilson 2006). WTO (2011) 
reveals that the amount of trade does not always exclusively depend on tariff reduction and 
suggests that transport infrastructure contributes to trade enhancement in developing 
countries. Knowing these circumstances, almost all regional communities in the developing 
world, prioritize the provision of high quality infrastructure for regional prosperity.  
Yet, despite their explicit benefits and needs, there is a huge gap between the demand 
and the supply of cross-border infrastructures in developing economies. Rough estimates on 
overall infrastructure needs allow us to possibly conjecture this gap. Lim and Mako (2015, 4) 
estimates that 5-year (2016-2020) Emerging Market Asia demand for infrastructure 
                                           
1 Borrowing from Fujimura and Adhikari (2010, 4), ‘cross-border infrastructure’ can be defined as either an 
infrastructure with activities spanning two or more countries, or a national infrastructure that has significant 
cross-border impact. Typically, ‘infrastructure’ includes transport, energy, and ICT (information communication 
technology) facilities. In this study, the main focus would be cross-border transport infrastructures.  
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investment totals $8.3 trillion. Such enormous needs is also true for Africa, where $93 billion 
is required annually to fill in the infrastructure gap, and Latin America, where 6.2% of the 
region’s GDP has to be invested in infrastructure for a prolonged time to meet the region’s 
demand (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2009; Lardé and Sánchez 2014, 4). Considering that 
only small portion of infrastructure projects are being supported by governments or IFIs 
(international financial institutions), it is reasonable to infer that cross-border infrastructures 
are largely undersupplied. 
 
Table 1. Infrastructure Demand by Continent  
Region Infrastructure Demand Source 
Emerging Market Asia $8.3 trillion (2016-2020) Lim and Mako (2015) 
Africa $93 billion annually (~2020) 
Foster and Briceño-
Garmendia (2009) 
Latin America 
6.2% of region’s GDP annually 
(2012-2020), approximately $320 
billion dollars in 2012 
Lardé and Sánchez (2014) 
 
Source: Organized by the author 
 
The huge undersupply of infrastructure originates primarily from coordination failure 
among national governments that derives from lack of trust, uneven distribution of costs and 
benefits, and difficulty in financing. The typology used by Sandler (2004) gives meaningful 
insights in this regard by identifying how cross-border infrastructures can be categorized and 
what type of interventions are necessary for them to be optimally provided. As one of 
regional public goods (RPGs), almost all cross-border infrastructure projects fall under the 
category of ‘club goods’ where the good is partially rival for its members but excludable to 
non-members. (Fujimura and Adhikari 2010, 32; See Table 2). In other words, while the good 
can be excluded to non-members through tolls or other measures, the marginal cost of 
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supplying another user is almost zero. This results in undersupply of the good due to 
incentives for free-riding on the cost of others.  
In overcoming the coordination failure, various supply technologies are suggested. 
These ‘aggregation technologies’ capture the nature of institutions and instruments that ought 
to be created to deliver the public good. Provision of cross-border transport infrastructure, for 
example, depends on the ‘weaker (or weakest) link technology’ where smaller (or smallest) 
contributions from weaker (or weakest) member countries ensure the effective aggregate 
supply level (Fujimura and Adhikari 2010, 33; See Table 2). This means that all party 
participation is essential and efforts to provide optimal level of infrastructure can be seriously 
undermined when one or few weak ‘links’ fail to supply the adequate quantity of the good. In 
order to realize the weaker link technology, collective action or supranational (or third party) 
intervention is needed to facilitate all party participation and assist weak link countries 
through provision of resources, skills, and knowledge.  
 
Table 2. Regional Public Goods: Typology and Examples 
Source: Fujimura and Adhikari 2010; adopted from Sandler 2004, 21 
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The problem in the international community, however, is the absence of 
supranational authority (‘anarchy’) to levy tax or implement such types of interventions. 
Hence, self-reinforcing mechanisms such as binding treaties, agreements, or support from 
Regional Development Banks (RDBs) such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) are 
necessary to facilitate the provision of RPGs (Fujimura 2004; Kuroda et al. 2007; Schiff and 
Winters 2002). A regional hegemon or influential donors can also intervene to take the lead in 
the coordination process. Indeed, wealthier countries or IFIs should play a leading role by 
promoting commonly shared vision and goals (Andrews-Speed 2011, 12-13).  
While abundant literature discuss why RPGs are undersupplied and how they can be 
better provided, there seem to be fewer literature on the different dynamics exhibited in the 
provision of RPGs (and their implications to trade and economic development) that arise 
from the difference in actors and institutions (rules of the game) involved. Actors and 
institutions are, in turn, determined by various drivers for regionalism2 that stem from history, 
international relations, distribution of power, and other regional settings. Accordingly, 
different regional communities may display different dynamics and outcome in overcoming 
the challenge of coordination failure. For instance, while both EAC and GMS desperately 
strive to provide high quality infrastructure, EAC is dominantly led by Kenya, a regional 
hegemon, and GMS is essentially led by the support of ADB. This might have a distinct 
impact on the progress that the two communities are making. Thus, by scrutinizing the two 
selected regional communities, this paper aims to reveal the drivers behind the emergence of 
regionalism in the two regions and how they affect the dynamics of the provision of transport 
infrastructure. It will also seek for their implications for trade and economic development. In 
the course of analysis, this paper will borrow international relations theories to explain for the 
                                           
2 “Regionalism includes formal economic cooperation and integration arrangements covering infrastructure, 
trade, investment, finance, and various types of regional public goods.” (Kuroda et al., 2007).  
5 
 
drivers of regionalism and employ a modified version of the political economy analysis (PEA) 
to compare transport infrastructure development of the two regions in-depth. The paper will 
contribute to the development literature by providing a cross-regional comparison on the 
dynamics and outcome of transport infrastructure development.  
 
II. DRIVERS FOR THE EMERGENCE OF REGIONALSIM3 
 
Unlike regionalism in EU or Northern America, members of both EAC and GMS are 
developing countries where developmental policies often take precedence over other 
integration policies. Hence, while there are numerous international relations theories that 
account for regionalism, identifying the main drivers for its emergence, particularly in 
regards to regional development governance, will be useful for analysis. Bruszt and Palestini 
(2016) classifies three main drivers for regional development cooperation to explain why 
state and market actors decide to cooperate and govern jointly over developmental policies. 
They are asymmetric interdependence, power and security, and critical events and diffusion 
of policy. 
 
A. Asymmetric Interdependence 
 
Increasing asymmetric interdependence among economies in face of regional and 
global market integration serves as a key driver for regionalism. State and market actors in 
close geographical boundaries are usually more interdependent and efforts to avoid the sub-
optimal effect deriving from uncoordinated actions leads them cooperate and govern possible 
developmental externalities through regional development governance (Keohane and Ostrom 
                                           
3 Much of the literature reviews in this section are indebted to The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Regionalism, edited by Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. 
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1995; Milner and Moravcsik 2009; Börzel 2016).     
 Liberal theories in international relations namely, neo-liberal institutionalism, the 
political economy approach, and neo-functionalism supports the asymmetric interdependence 
argument. First, neoliberal institutionalism or rationalist functionalism focuses on the 
interdependence and shared interests among states. This approach argues that efforts to 
achieve shared interests through interdependence leads to establishing international 
institutions, which tend to be strengthened at regional level (Keohane 1984; Martin and 
Simmons, 1998). For supporters of this approach, globalization and global market force is the 
key external driver that fosters regional integration to increase cross-border mobility, 
economic linkages, and trade. Various regional institutions such as EU, NAFTA, and ASEAN 
are efforts to respond to globalization and deal with negative externalities such as diversion 
of trade and investment (Börzel 2016, 46). In particular, while developing countries once 
pursued protective regionalism, regional integration process now has become a way to be part 
of the global market and attract international investment (Mistry 2003; Puntigliano and 
Briceno-Ruiz 2013; Bruszt and Palestini 2016). 
The second theory is the political economy approach or liberal theories of 
international cooperation that are more concerned with the domestic political process of 
interest aggregation and interest representation (Börzel 2016, 46). Domestic interest groups 
try to influence the state’s international decision-making by actively lobbying their 
governments. The access to domestic decision-making processes by these interest groups and 
their capacity to push forward their agendas are crucial for penetrating their demand for 
regional institution-building (Rogowski 1989; Milner 1997). In the case of NAFTA and 
APEC agreements, the American businesses lobbied the governments to join them (Milner 
1995; Cameron and Tomlin 2002).  
Thirdly, neo-functionalism stresses the role played by interest groups, professional 
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associations, producer groups, and labor unions. These groups form transnational coalitions 
with groups in other states and ally with regional actors that share similar stances to regional 
integration. Then they may pressure the state government for more effective regional 
institution which promotes trade liberalization by compromising their sovereignty (Stone 
Sweet and Caporaso 1998). A good example would be European companies that joined with 
the European Commission to push for the Single European Market and Currency (Sandholtz 
and Zysman 1989; Cowles 1995).  
 
B. Power and Security 
 
Power and security issues involved in the geopolitics of the international system also 
serve as important drivers of regionalism. Such power-based approaches are vocally argued 
by neo-realists. This group of scholars assume that states are concerned with the equal 
distribution of power among them and thus believe that cooperation is generally risky 
(Baldwin 2013). Yet, powerful states promote regional integration in order to pursue their 
economic or geopolitical interests. According to the hegemonic stability theory, powerful 
states in the region takes the leading role in regional integration to ease the tensions and 
mitigate the security dilemma in the region (Gilpin 1987; Grieco 1997). For instance, the U.S. 
played the role as an exogenous hegemon in the integration process of the European 
Community and ASEAN (Gruber 2000; Acharya 2001). The creation of RDBs are also 
invoked as examples of this approach since they are considered as vehicles of global and 
regional powers to expand and stabilize their influence on a certain region (Vivares 2013; 
Babb 2009). The U.S. support for the creation of IDB as part of the Inter-American system 
can be viewed in this way. Recent tension between China and the U.S. over the establishment 
of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is another case that can be interpreted in this 
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context.  
Second explanation based on the power-based approach is that states form regional 
alliance to balance the power against regional or exogenous hegemons (Walt 1987). For 
example, Brazil and Venezuela strongly supported MERCOSUR in order to prevent further 
U.S. influence in Latin America (Mera 2005; Tussie 2009). While this provides a different 
view from the hegemonic stability theory, both are power-based approaches that argue in 
favor of states acting to balance power in the absence of supranational authority (anarchy). 
 
C. Critical Events and Diffusion of Policy  
 
Policy ideas, especially in times of exogenous shocks or crisis, can also be drivers of 
regionalism and regional development cooperation. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 
triggered the Western European countries to create European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) for economic transformation of the Easter European countries (Bruszt 
and Palestini 2016, 381-382). In similar vein, Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) that was 
launched following Asian Financial Crisis can also be viewed with this approach. 
Regionalism and regional development cooperation can also occur through diffusion 
of policies either by direct (sender-driven) influence mechanisms or indirect (recipient-driven) 
mechanisms (Risse 2016, 88-91). These mechanisms can again be categorized into logic of 
consequence theorized by regional choice models and logic of appropriateness/arguing 
conceptualized by sociological institutionalism and social constructivism (Risse 2016, 89; 
See Table 3). First, on the direct influence mechanism side, regionalism can happen when 
physical or legal coercion is imposed through external stimuli. Yet, such a case is rather rare 
in the emergence of regionalism. Secondly, diffusion may also happen when promoters of 
certain institutional models or ideas provide rewards (in the form of financial or technical 
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assistance) or impose costs through sanctions. For instance, EU’s support for the African 
Union (AU) through development aid and market access to EU through European Partnership 
Agreements (EPA) can be viewed as a direct diffusion mechanism (Engel 2015). And thirdly, 
in regards to logic of appropriateness, norms socialization and persuasion can bring 
regionalism by promoting actors to meet social expectations (socialization) or persuade one 
another in order to convince others on the benefits of regional cooperation (Risse 2016, 90). 
UN and other international organizations (IOs) that are at the center of various regional 
governance such as security, development, gender, environment, and human rights are 
representative in this regard. On the indirect mechanism side, competition involves 
“unilateral adjustments of behavior” where actors compete each other to satisfy certain 
performance criteria (Risse 2016, 90). This mechanism usually refers to free trade agreement 
(FTAs) or preferential trade agreement (PTAs) where states compete to get advantageous 
access to markets. Lesson-drawing is concerned with how actors seek to resemble others for 
policies and institutions that have worked effectively in solving similar problems. Normative 
emulation is related to actors emulating for normative reasons such as increasing legitimacy, 
improving human rights, and curbing corruption while mimicry involves passive 
“downloading” of policy ideas or institutional models (Risse 2016, 90-91).  
 
Table 3. Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion 
 Logic of Consequences Logic of Appropriateness/Arguing 
Direct Influence 
(sender-driven) 
- Coercion 
- Positive Incentives and Negative 
Sanctions 
- Norm Socialization and 
Persuasion 
Indirect 
Diffusion/Emulation 
(recipient-driven) 
- Competition 
- Lesson Drawing 
- Normative Emulation 
- Mimicry 
  
Source: Risse 2016, adopted from Börzel and Risse 2009; Börzel and Risse 2012 
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Most diffusion mechanisms, whether they employ material incentives or sanctions or 
not, are essentially constructivist in nature since they entail ideational drivers such as policy 
ideas, norms, and discourses. Moreover, diffusion is an active process of translation, 
interpretation, learning, incorporation, and resistance where selective adoption and adaptation 
are more likely than passive adoption or institutional convergence (Solingen 2012; Klingler-
Vidra and Schleifer 2014). In this sense, the diffusion explanation can be seen as part of the 
constructivist theory in international relations.   
 
D. Combined Drivers 
 
The three main drivers of regionalism are not mutually exclusive and can be 
combined to better analyze the emergence of regionalism and regional development 
cooperation (Börzel and Risse 2016). For instance, IAI can be explained with both 
‘asymmetric interdependence’ and ‘diffusion mechanism’ as it seeks for deepened economic 
integration and also emulated Euopean Cohesion Policy (Bruszt and Palestini 2016, 382-383). 
Fund for the Economic Convergence of Mercosur (FOCEM) can also be understood in this 
context as it aimed to achieve better economic cooperation and EU technocrats played an 
active role transferring knowledge to Mercosur officials (Dabene 2009; Jetschke and Murray 
2012). Such combination of regionalism drivers seems all the more important for analyzing 
regional communities that are composed of developing countries. As briefly mentioned above, 
EAC and GMS are different from EU where most members are advanced capitalist 
economies with democratic systems and strongly emphasize integration through regional 
institution building. Conventional theories on regionalism such as neo-realism or neo-
liberalism are rooted in the European experience which suggests that their explanatory power 
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may not be universal. In recent years, Eurocentric approaches to regionalism with heavy 
emphasis on compromising sovereignty through state-led formal institution building have 
been criticized for overlooking the focus on autonomy among developing countries in the 
context of decolonization and nationalism and the rising influence of non-state actors. Thus, 
rather than adopting one ‘universal’ theory, combining them to explain for the emergence of 
regionalism may provide a more clear picture of the reality. 
In this paper, the case of EAC and GMS will be explained by combining two theories 
but with different gravity. While the two regional communities share the similar ‘primary’ 
driver for regionalism, they differ on their ‘complementary’ driver. In the following section, 
drivers for regionalism in EAC and GMS will be elaborated by delving into the development 
history of the two communities.  
Below is a summary table of the regionalism drivers discussed in this section. 
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Table 4. Drivers for the Emergence of Regionalism – Summary Table 
Drivers for 
Regionalism 
School of Thought and Theories Authors Cases 
Asymmetric 
Interdependence 
Liberalism 
Neo-Liberal 
Institutionalism 
Keohane 1984; Martin 
and Simmons, 1998; 
Börzel 2016; 
Mistry 2003; Rivarola 
Puntigliano and 
Briceno-Ruiz 2013; 
Bruszt and Palestini 
2016 
EU, NAFTA, 
ASEAN 
Political 
Economy 
Approach 
Rogowski 1989; 
Milner 1997; 
Milner 1995; 
Cameron and Tomlin 
2002 
NAFTA, APEC 
Neo-
Functionalism 
Stone Sweet and 
Caporaso 1998; 
Sandholtz and Zyman 
1989; Cowles 1995 
Single European 
Market and 
Currency 
Power and 
Security 
Neo-Realism 
Hegemonic 
Stability Theory 
Gilpin 1987; Grieco 
1997; 
Gruber 2000; Acharya 
2001; 
Vivares 2013; Babb 
2009 
EC, ASEAN, 
RDBs (e.g. IDB, 
AIIB) 
Regional 
Alliance Theory 
Walt 1987; 
Gomez Mera 2005; 
Tussie 2009 
MERCOSUR 
Critical Events 
and Diffusion of 
Policy 
Constructivism Policy Diffusion 
Engel 2015; 
Risse 2016; 
Solingen 2012; 
Klingler-Vidra and 
Schleifer 2014; Jahn 
2015 
EBRD, IAI, EU 
support for AU, 
UN and IOs, 
FTAs, PTAs 
Combined Drivers 
Different Combinations of the 
Drivers and Theories (e.g. 
asymmetric interdependence + 
policy diffusion) 
Börzel and Risse 
2016; 
De Andrade Correa 
2010; Dabene 2009; 
Jetschke and Murray 
2012; 
Bruszt and Palestini 
2016 
IAI, FOCEM 
Source: Organized by the author 
 
III. DRIVERS FOR REGIONALISM IN EAC AND GMS 
 
This section will reveal the specific drivers for regionalism in EAC and GMS by 
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looking into their development history. Then, it will suggest which combination of theories 
best account for their emergence respectively.  
 
A. The History of EAC 
 
In the late 19th century and early 20th century, colonial interests in East Africa were 
dominated by the British (who controlled Kenya and Uganda) and the Germans (who 
controlled then Tanganyika (later Tanzania)). At that time, the British interests were focused 
on Uganda which led to the construction of the Kenya-Uganda Railway between 1897 and 
1901. This railway connection served as a great incentive to draw European settlers to Kenya 
as the transportation of goods was made easier (Kafeero 2009, 82-83). As the European 
community grew, Kenya began to acquire a dominant position in East Africa. This was 
largely attributable to Kenya’s economic structure (Kenya: settler plantation economy, not 
much export-oriented / Uganda: peasant economy, Tanganyika: mixture of peasant and 
plantation economy, both export-oriented) that allowed its monetary economy to develop 
thanks to the large capital brought in by settlers (Kafeero 2009, 82-83). Based on the 
accumulated capital, Kenya was able to better develop its manufacturing and services sector 
becoming the major supplier of manufactured goods in East Africa. The differing pattern of 
economic development of the three countries paved the way for later wide range of 
compatibility problems (Reith and Boltz 2011, 92-93).   
When Tanganyika came under the British control after the defeat of the Germans in 
World War I, the need for a systematic integration of the three countries intensified (Kafeero 
2009, 82-83). The customs union had already been established between Kenya and Uganda in 
1917 so Tanganyika also joined the union in 1927. Such efforts were followed by the East 
African High Commission (EAHC) from 1948 to 1961. The EAHC provided a customs union, 
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a common external tariff, currency, and postage. It also dealt with common services in 
transport and communications, research, and education.  
After independence (Tanganyika in 1961, Uganda in 1962, and Kenya in 1963), 
EAHC activities that were formerly run under the colonial rule were reorganized and the 
commission was replaced by the East African Common Services Organization (EACSO, 
1961 ~1967). At the time, many observers thought it would lead to a political federation 
between the three territories. Yet, EASCO policies still echoed dominant colonial views and 
the new organization confronted numerous difficulties due to lack of joint planning and fiscal 
policy, separate political policies, and Kenya's dominant economic position (Kafeero 2009, 
82-83). In 1967, the EACSO was again replaced by EAC. The aim was to strengthen the ties 
between the members through a common market, a common customs tariff, and a range of 
public services to achieve balanced economic growth within the region.  
However, despite such ambitious goals, the EAC collapsed after ten years in 1977. 
The main culprits behind the collapse included lack of steering functions, disproportionate 
distribution of benefits among members, purely intergovernmental structure, and conflicting 
opinions among leading players (Reith and Boltz 2011, 92). Some of the detailed conflicts 
among the members include demands by Kenya for more seats than Uganda and Tanzania in 
decision-making organs, disagreements with Ugandan dictator Idi Amin who demanded that 
Tanzania as a member should not harbor forces fighting to topple the another member 
government (Uganda and Tanzania actually went into a war from 1978 to 1979), and the 
disparate economic systems of socialism in Tanzania and capitalism in Kenya. The three 
member states lost over sixty years of co-operation and the benefits of economies of scale.  
The cooperation resumed after almost 30 years when the East African Heads of State 
signed agreement establishing the Permanent Tripartite Commission for East African Co-
operation in Kampala, Uganda on 30 November 1993. With further agreements and meetings, 
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in November 1999, a Treaty for the establishment of the new East African Community was 
signed and from 7 July 2000 the Treaty entered into force. Its key objective was to develop 
policies at widening and deepening cooperation in all fields, not just economic or trade 
policies, for mutual benefits of its member (Article 5 of the EAC Treaty) (Van Hoestenberghe 
et al. 2009, 237). And in 2007 the membership was expanded to include Rwanda and Burundi. 
Most recently, the Republic of South Sudan acceded to the Treaty on 15 April 2016 and 
became a full member on 15 August 2016 (EAC 2016a). 
 
B. The History of GMS 
 
At the outset, inter-state cooperation around the Mekong River emerged in the 
context of decolonization and post-war reconstruction. After World War II, under the 
resolution of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), The Economic Commission 
on Asia and Far East (ECAFE, later Economic and Social Council for Asia and the Pacific 
(ESCAP)) was created to assist post-war economic reconstruction providing some 
development projects in the region. The Mekong development cooperation scheme began to 
materialize around the lower Mekong when Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam were declared 
independent from France in the 1954 Geneva Conference and the ECAFE published a report 
in 1957 titled ‘Development of Water Resources in the Lower Mekong Basin’ highlighting 
the need to harness the region’s rich natural endowments to develop irrigation systems and 
dams. Based largely on the report, the Mekong Committee was established in September 
1957 with the function to provide financial and technical support for development projects 
such as dam construction and hydropower generation (Vannarith 2010, 5). Yet, the committee 
was only joined by Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam since People’s Republic of 
China was not internationally recognized then and Myanmar was reluctant to be part of the 
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initiative (Vannarith 2010, 5). The committee lasted from 1957 to 1975 but its vision of 
carrying out large-scale projects was not realized with only few dams being constructed in its 
member countries (Vannarith 2010, 5-7). Maybe the only successful intergovernmental 
project was the Nam Ngum Dam and the Hydro Electric Power Plant completed in 1971 in 
Laos whose electricity was sold to Thailand.  
Despite such ambitious plans for cooperation, the committee began to stumble from 
the late 1970s and had only interim status from 1978 due to changing domestic political 
situations and rising tension in the region.4 The regimes changed simultaneously in 1975 in 
Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Also, from the late 1970s and 1980s, the countries 
surrounding the Mekong River were divided by different ideologies (Rosario 2010, 2). 
Thailand, despite a series of military governments from several coups, firmly aligned with 
western democracies and sought to establish a free-market democratic system. On the other 
hand, Vietnam ideologically aligned itself with the Soviet Union after its victory against the 
U.S. in 1975. The U.S. imposed economic sanctions on the country that were only lifted in 
1994. Vietnam also invaded Cambodia in 1978 which worsened its relationship with China. 
Along with Vietnam, Laos also aligned itself with the Soviet Union since 1975. Soviet 
Union-Vietnam-Laos maintained a ‘special relationship’ with each other through the 
formalized treaty of friendship and cooperation in 1977 (Rosario 2010, 2-3). Cambodia’s 
alliance with China made the region a ‘three-way ideological stand-off’ among four countries 
(Rosario 2010, 2).  
Almost two decades of confrontation unraveled with the collapse of the Soviet Union 
in 1989 that changed international political and economic environment. Facing possibility of 
                                           
4 The interim status lasted until 1995 and in April 1995, the Mekong River Commission (MRC) was launched 
to replace the Mekong Committee. Yet, compared to the broader development goals of the GMS program, the 
MRC exclusively focuses on dealing with river and water resources. This paper discussed the Mekong 
Committee only to delineate the evolution of development cooperation in the region and not because it is the 
predecessor of the GMS program. The main focus of analysis in this paper are the drivers and dynamics of 
development cooperation associated with GMS which began from the early 1990s.     
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economic collapse, Vietnam withdrew its forces from Cambodia ending the ten years of 
occupation. Landlocked Laos, another former ally of the Soviet Union, had to search for 
ways to open up the economy. After the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces, the different 
factions in Cambodia agreed to end the internal conflict in 1991. As with the rest of it 
neighbors, Cambodia pursued for a series of economic reforms to move away from socialism 
and move into the market economy. For Thailand, it had to reestablish its relations with 
neighboring countries and expand economic activities with the main goal of normalizing its 
relationship with China. Thailand’s flexible and adaptive foreign policy provided great 
advantage for the country to benefit from ADB-led regional cooperation (Rosario 2010, 2-3). 
Under such historical circumstances, the origin of the GMS program can be traced 
back to 1987 when ADB decided to aid the construction of hydroelectric power plant in Xeset 
(Ogasawara 2011, 458). Located in southern Laos, Xeset is a tributary of the Mekong River 
where investigation for hydroelectric power development began in the 1980s. Yet, 
implementation for further plans seemed impossible due to the escalation of the Cambodian 
conflict and exacerbating Lao-Thai relations that rose from armed clashes around their border 
(Ogasawara 2011, 458). Here, ADB’s active engagement played a significant role by bridging 
the communication between Electricite du Lao (EDL) and Electricity Generating Authority of 
Thailand (EGAT) (Rosario 2010, 4-5). Luckily, such efforts by the ADB were backed by the 
fact that positive Lao-Thai relations were encouraged by Hanoi and the Nam Ngum Hydro 
Power Plant, a successful legacy of the Mekong Committee, that still operated even in the 
1980s with continued supply from the Lao-side and punctual payments on the Thai-side 
(Ogasawara 2011, 457). In particular, based on this legacy, there was a shared sense of 
credibility on the ADB’s new project between the electric power staffs of two countries 
(Ogasawara 2011, 457). The Xeset hydroelectric project took 32 months to complete starting 
from 1988 and finishing in 1991.   
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The mitigation of conflict and intensified pressure for economic liberalization, along 
with the impact of the success of the Xeset project, brought GMS program on the table. With 
China, Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos firmly enrolled in ADB’s development assistance by the 
late 1980s, Cambodia was also able to join this list after signing the Paris Peace Accord in 
1991 that eventually ended its internal conflict (Rosario 2010, 7-8). In 1992, the ADB 
arranged the first Ministerial Conference in ADB headquarters located in Manila bringing all 
six countries at once (Cambodia, Laos, Yunnan Province of China, Myanmar, Thailand, and 
Vietnam)5. During this conference the concept of GMS was formally introduced and adopted. 
The countries agreed upon undertaking various feasibility studies and developing a master 
plan for the program. The ADB assumed the role as a facilitator of dialogues, a catalyst for 
potential projects, provider of technical and financial assistance, and as the secretariat to 
GMS (Rosario 2010, 8-9).  
In 1993, the second ministerial meeting was held to identify seven priority projects: 
infrastructure, trade and investment, transport, energy, environment, tourism, and human 
resource development. The third meeting followed in 1994 to discuss profile of projects for 
possible financing. The ministerial meeting took place annually from then on and the GMS 
Summit meeting also began from 2002 occurring five times until now (latest in 2014). In 
addition, working group meeting have also taken place since 1992 several times a year on 
various sectors of the agreed development priorities.      
 
C. Regionalism Drivers for EAC and GMS 
 
This section aims to identify the ‘primary’ and ‘complementary’ driver for the 
emergence of regionalism in EAC and GMS by reflecting on their respective development 
                                           
5 The Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region of China joined GMS in 2004.  
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histories. While both regional communities share ‘neo-liberal’ driver as the primary driver, 
they differ on the complementary driver for regional cooperation.   
 
1) EAC  
 
Although cooperation among Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania originated from colonial 
backgrounds under the British control, the key driver for regional integration was to build a 
customs union and moreover, a common market to maximize the economic benefits of the 
three countries. Even in the 1980s and early 1990s after the former EAC collapsed, the three 
countries continued their cooperative efforts in search for spheres of common economic 
interest through the tri-partite working group and the tri-partite committee of experts devised 
by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. With the force of globalization intensifying, the leaders 
of the three countries had to admit that their competitiveness must be strengthened by 
forming an economic bloc. The vision and the mission of the re-established EAC well-reflect 
such perceptions. The vision of EAC states that EAC “is to be a prosperous, competitive, 
secure, stable and politically united East Africa (EAC 2016b).” Moreover, remarks on 
political and social integration notwithstanding, its mission puts emphasis on increasing 
competitiveness and promoting trade and investment.6 Hence, we can argue that the primary 
driver for regionalism in EAC is most closely associated with ‘neo-liberal institutionalism’ 
which stresses the cooperation to achieve shared interests by establishing international 
institutions and the role of global market force as the key external driver to increase cross-
border mobility, economic linkages, trade, and investment. 
Yet, this is not the end of the story. While the rationale for economic cooperation is 
                                           
6 “The mission of the Community is to widen and deepen economic, political, social and cultural integration in 
order to improve the quality of life of the people of East Africa through increased competitiveness, value added 
production, trade and investments.” EAC Homepage, http://www.eac.int/about/key-documents, accessed 
October 10, 2016. 
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clear for the region, the role of Kenya as the regional hegemon must not be overlooked. As 
previously mentioned, Kenya assumed a dominant economic position in the region thanks to 
the largely accumulated colonial capital. It has been leading the regional integration process 
in order to consolidate its position as the regional hegemon. Also, it not only seeks to exert its 
economic power but also tries to integrate the region to mitigate security concerns and 
promote peace and stability. Eastern Africa has suffered greatly from civil wars, cross-border 
conflicts, social strife, and arms trafficking (AfDB 2011, 2-3). In particular, Kenya has 
suffered greatly from lost trading opportunities due to closed borders (e.g. Somali and Kenya, 
to prevent infiltration of combatants and inflow of small arms and light weapons) and conflict 
in the border areas (e.g. the Oromo insurgency in Ethiopia) (Chikwanha 2007, 6-7). Kenya 
also had to bear the burden of thousands of Sudanese refugees most of whom have no means 
of earning an income (Chikwanha 2007, 6-7).7 Indeed, Kenya hosted the largest number of 
refugees in the region between 1990 and 2013 with more than 530,000 in its asylums 
(Verwimp and Maystadt 2015, 9-10). Since maintaining peace and security is critical to 
attract FDI, enhance growth, and reduce poverty, there are good reasons for Kenya and other 
northern EAC countries to mitigate conflict in the region (AfDB 2011, 2-3). However, such 
momentum to speed ahead in the area of peace and security is challenged by Tanzania, 
located at the south of the region and is in rivalry with Kenya, who holds back in this process 
(Hull et al. 2011, 25).  
 Such motivations for regional cooperation and the power game aspect within it is in 
line with the argument of the hegemonic stability theory which emphasizes the pursuit of 
economic and geopolitical interests by powerful states in the region to ease the tensions and 
mitigate the security dilemma. While the force of globalization and economic prosperity 
serve as the main driver of regionalism in EAC, security dilemmas and hegemonic lead of 
                                           
7 This may actually explain for the recent expansion of the EAC to include South Sudan.  
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Kenya also plays a significant role in the process. Thus, this can be a complementary driver 
for regionalism in EAC.  
 In sum, it can be argued that regionalism for EAC emerged primarily due to a ‘neo-
liberal’ driver (neo-liberal institutionalism) complemented by a ‘neo-realist’ driver 
(hegemonic stability theory). To put this in a simpler form, we can say that EAC came into 
being by ‘realist-liberal (complementary-primary)’ driver for regionalism.  
 
2) GMS 
 
Similar to EAC, countries surrounding the Mekong River also strived to achieve 
economic prosperity and enrich the livelihood of people under the intensifying pressures of 
globalization. The Mekong Committee and various development projects that took place in 
the region’s history were mostly attempts to better the economic conditions, though not all of 
them were successful. It is well-known that the vision of the GMS program is to realize a 
prosperous, integrated, and harmonious sub-region with focus on increased physical 
connectivity, competitiveness, and building greater sense of community.8 Such tendencies, 
again, well correspond with major arguments of ‘neo-liberal institutionalism’ suggesting 
GMS also emerged from the ‘neo-liberal’ driver for regionalism.  
GMS, however, experienced a slightly different path from EAC in terms of 
developing its institutions and procedures for regional cooperation. First, the critical event of 
Soviet collapse significantly reshaped the geopolitics of the region by unraveling the two 
decades of confrontation among GMS countries. As mentioned earlier in the history of GMS, 
the collapse of the Soviet Union forced socialist countries to open up their economies and 
implement economic reforms in face of possible economic collapse. Countries like Thailand 
                                           
8  ADB Homepage, https://www.adb.org/publications/greater-mekong-subregion-economic-cooperation-
program-overview, accessed October 14, 2016.  
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also pushed to normalize the relations with neighboring countries and expand its economic 
activities. These circumstances have triggered the need for regional cooperation and changes 
in policies.  
Second, in the wake of cataclysmic geopolitical change, ADB played a significant 
role as the ‘honest broker’ to provide neutral coordination, technical expertise, broader 
perspective, and financial resources. The leadership of ADB contributed greatly to the 
success of the Xeset hydroelectric project and the first Ministerial Conference at ADB 
headquarters. Here, it can be argued that sender(ADB)-driven diffusion mechanisms to 
promote regional cooperation were present, especially in the form of norms socialization and 
persuasion in order to convince GMS countries on the benefits of regional cooperation.   
Therefore, the emergence GMS is primarily attributable to a ‘neo-liberal’ driver and 
partially to critical events and ‘policy diffusion’ mechanisms. In simpler form, it can be said 
that GMS was established due to ‘constructivist-liberal’ driver for regionalism.   
 
IV. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMPARISON 
 
To best accurately capture and reveal the diverging dynamics of infrastructure 
development which derive from differing regionalism drivers, one must look into various 
factors that influence cross-border transport development such as geography, economic 
structure, institutions (‘rules of the game’ or frameworks and procedures), and actors and how 
they interact. This not only provides a holistic view but also allows effective cross-regional 
comparison by sorting out region-specific factors and assessing the degree of impact of the 
regionalism drivers. For this purpose, this study will employ a modified version of the 
political economy approach (PEA) as its analytical framework. According to OECD-DAC9, 
                                           
9 Adopted from Collinson (2003).  
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PEA is defined as an approach “concerned with the interaction of political and economic 
processes in a society: the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and 
individuals, and the processes that create, sustain, and transform these relationships over 
time.” The most famous PEA framework utilized in the field of international development is 
the ‘Drivers of Change (DoC)’ approach created by Department for International 
Development (DFID) in U.K which aims to understand the political economy environment of 
the aid recipient country (DFID 2009). It considers the dynamic interaction between three 
sets of factors (structures, institutions, and agents) 10  in order to identify the political 
economic processes that have critical impact on aid effectiveness, policy and institutional 
reform, and domestic sectoral development (DFID 2009).  
This paper intends to modify the analytical framework of DoC so that it best suits the 
purpose of this paper. While the original version of the approach was designed for country 
level analysis focusing on selective factors from structural features, institutions, and agents, 
the modified PEA in this paper carries out a regional community level analysis with more 
elaborated factors. This allows a clear cross-regional comparison between the two regional 
communities and prevent inconsistencies that may arise from broad definition and selective 
use of various factors. As shown in Table 5, the unit of analysis is the regional community 
and PEA variables are broken down into specific categories. Filling in the blank spaces of the 
table will be the objective of the rest of the paper.  
 
 
 
                                           
10 Here, structures are broadly defined as long-term contextual factors that are not readily influenced due to the 
time scale needed or have exogenous determinants (DFID 2009, 9). They include economic and social structures, 
geo-strategic positions, natural resource endowments, demographic shifts etc. Institutions are formal 
(constitutional rules, codified laws etc.) or informal (norms, values etc.) arrangements that shape the political 
economic processes and agents are key actors and stakeholders who exert power or influence in the policy or 
decision making process (DFID 2009, 9). 
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Table 5. Analytical Framework for Comparison – Modified PEA 
Regional Community 
EAC  
(East African 
Community) 
GMS  
(Greater Mekong  
Sub-region) 
Driver for Regionalism Realist-Liberal Constructivist-Liberal 
PEA Variables 
Structure 
(Foundational 
Factors) 
Geography 
  
Culture & Identity 
  
Economic Structure 
  
History &  
Country Relations   
Institution  
(Rules of the Game) 
Formal  
  
Informal  
  
Agents Key Actors 
  
 Source: Organized by the author 
 
V. STRUCTURAL FACTORS 
 
A. Geography 
 
Geographical feature is a crucial structural factor that affects the development of 
cross-border transport infrastructure. In particular, whether a country is landlocked or not 
determines how certain members of the regional community approach transport integration 
since cross-border transport infrastructures bear larger significance for trade and economic 
development depending on their geographical positions. In the EAC, the development of 
transport infrastructure is far more important for landlocked Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda 
than Kenya or Tanzania (See Figure 1). Not only the three countries are smaller in terms of 
their land size and economy but they are also more than 1,000km away from the ocean port 
(Brenton and Hoffman 2016, 130-131). Therefore, transport integration is a must for Burundi, 
Rwanda, and Uganda while it is less so for the other two countries. Yet, Kenya’s interest as a 
regional hegemon and growing private sector pressure within Kenya demand it to stay very 
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attentive to regional integration. For these reasons, Kenya, along with Rwanda and Uganda, 
have taken lead in many areas of regional integration including infrastructure development, 
single tourist visa, enhanced labor mobility, and implementation of single customs territory 
(Brenton and Hoffman 2016, 131). And because the EAC secretariat does not play a 
coordination role in implementing formal EAC transport policy frameworks (such as the 
EAC Treaty, the 2010-2015 EAC Transport Strategy, and the 2009 Railways Masterplan), 
transport planning and project selection are largely carried out by national governments 
(Mathieson 2016).  
 
Figure 1. East African Community11 
 
Source: United Nations Geospatial Information Section 
                                           
11 This map does not include South Sudan that joined the EAC on August 15, 2016 as a full member.  
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http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/eastafr.pdf, accessed November 
25, 2016 
 
Due to aforementioned circumstances, transport infrastructure was developed rather 
asymmetrically in the EAC. For instance, while 94-97% of the key roads that link Rwanda-
Uganda-Kenya (Kigali-Kampala-Nairobi) in the Northern Corridor are paved, only 57% of 
the roads are paved between Bujumbura (Burundi) and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) in the 
Central Corridor (EAC 2011).12 Greater traffic is concentrated along the Northern Corridor 
with more than 80% of the annual average daily traffic being above 1,000 vehicles while the 
same figure is only 39% for the Dar es Salaam-Bujumbura corridor (EAC 2011).13 The time 
and cost required for the movement of goods (mostly imports) are also larger using the 
Central Corridor than the Northern Corridor (AfDB 2013, 18-19). Surprisingly, it is more 
competitive for Burundi to utilize the Northern Corridor even when Bujumbura is closer to 
Dar es Salaam than to Mombasa (AfDB 2013, 19-20).14 Moreover, although both ports of 
Mombasa and Dar es Salaam are underperforming by global standards, the port of Dar es 
Salaam particularly faces severe capacity constraints which serve as source of port 
inefficiency and high logistics costs (Brenton and Hoffman 2016, 128-129). Freight 
forwarders and transporters in Burundi and Rwanda are even considering routing their 
containers through Mombasa and Teveta (border between Kenya and Tanzania) to avoid the 
congestion at the Dar es Salaam port (Brenton and Hoffman 2016, 133). It is told that the 
Kenyan Government has already secured funds to rehabilitate the roads at Teveta (Brenton 
and Hoffman 2016, 133). Such slow progress in expanding the Dar es Salaam port is likely to 
                                           
12 The Northern Corridor is the main corridor in East Africa connecting Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, 
South Sudan, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and northern Tanzania. The Central Corridor links 
Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and the DRC. See EAC (2011) pg17 and pg31. 
13 Kenya alone accounted for half (52%) of average intra-EAC exports from 2010 to 2013. Uganda and 
Tanzania shared one fifths each (see Mathieson 2016, 10-11). 
14 While the time required to import goods through the Mombasa-Bujumbura corridor takes a little more than 
600 hours, it takes more than 800 hours when the Dar es Salaam-Bujumbura corridor is used. Also, importing 
goods through the Dar es Salaam-Bujumbura corridor costs almost double that of using the Mombasa-
Bujumbura corridor. For detailed figures, see AfDB (2013) pg20.  
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have deleterious effects on Central Corridor development (Brenton and Hoffman 2016, 133). 
And yet, Tanzania seems more concerned with the cargo spreading to Zambia through the 
Southern Corridor which takes up the second largest portion (15%) of cargo in the Dar es 
Salaam port (Brenton and Hoffman 2016, 128).  
In the case of GMS, two geographical features stand out. First, Lao PDR and Yunnan 
Province of China are the two landlocked countries (province) in the region (See Figure 2). 
Unlike other GMS countries that were in favorable condition to access sea transport, Lao 
PDR and Yunnan Province had to engage deeply and actively for regional integration in order 
to reduce transport costs and improve economic linkages within the GMS and with other 
regions. GMS cooperation would not have been possible if it were not for the active 
commitment of Lao PDR and Yunnan province of China that laid the cornerstones of the 
program. As Ogasawara (2011) pointed out, positive Lao-Thai talks after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and Yunnan provincial government’s aim to “open door of Yunnan to Southeast 
Asia” contributed significantly to moving the GMS program forward. 
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Figure 2. Greater Mekong Subregion 
 
Source: United Nations Geospatial Information Section 
http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/mekong.pdf, accessed November 
25, 2016 
 
Secondly, as hinted in its name ‘Greater Mekong Subregion’, the Mekong River runs 
through all six countries. It was mentioned earlier that the regional development cooperation 
began with the Mekong development cooperation scheme to build irrigation systems and 
dams to harness the region’s rich water resources. Although historical ordeals prevented the 
regional cooperation from progressing seamlessly, the success of the Nam Ngum and Xeset 
hydroelectric projects served as positive legacies to expand the scope of regional cooperation. 
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The sense of achievement and trust built through successful management of sensitive water 
resources fueled ADB to elaborate its regional cooperative scheme for cross border 
infrastructures. In 1995, the ADB established a Transport Master Plan and further updated it 
in 1998 and 2003.15 Based on these plans, the ADB and GMS countries developed nine 
‘economic corridors’ that entail transport infrastructure integrated with other economic 
opportunities (See Figure 3). According to the most recent review of GMS transport sector 
development by ADB (2014), overarching goals titled ‘completing the transport networks in 
GMS’ and ‘facilitating economic efficiency to reduce transport costs’ were rated ‘highly 
successful’ and ‘successful’ respectively. While such results may not be all credible, it can be 
said that transport network development in GMS were carried out in a balanced manner with 
broad member participation (an exception would be Myanmar which remained as a missing 
link until recently due to domestic political situations).   
 
                                           
15 The evolution of the GMS transport sector program will be discussed in the ‘History and Country Relations’ 
section.  
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Figure 3. GMS Economic Corridors 
 
Source: ADB 2014 
 
B. Culture and Identity 
 
While ethnic and cross-border conflicts are interspersed in East Africa, historical 
experiences and ties contributed to creating a common cultural base among citizens of EAC 
member states. In addition to the widespread use of the Kiswahili language, experience as 
small scale farmers or petty commodity producers under colonialism and the post-colonial 
nation building process fostered a sense of shared identity that assisted the establishment of 
the EAC (Mathieson 2016, 9). Also, the narrative of Pan-Africanism which originally 
inspired the initial post-independent East African integration movement continues to play its 
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role in emphasizing African distinctiveness, shared histories of struggle, and the need to 
‘catch up’ and accelerate development (Shivji 2009).  
The positive perception of EAC among EAC citizens attest the above explanation. 
The percentage of people with positive perception of regional integration greatly 
outnumbered those with negative perceptions in all five countries of the EAC (TMEA 2013). 
This has helped establishing a common tourist visa and free cross-border movement of 
people simply with ID cards. Therefore, culture and identity issues in the EAC does not seem 
to pose a significant risk to the idea of developing cross-border infrastructures in the region.  
GMS celebrates cultural, ethnical, and linguistical diversity. In terms of ethnicity, 
there are about 80 different ethnic groups in the region. People inhabiting in the valleys and 
lowlands of the subregion compose the majority group while the ethnic minorities are usually 
found in the highlands, mountainous areas between country borders (ADB 2012a, 55-58). 
Both the majority ethnic populations and the highland ethnic minorities belong to three major 
families of languages used in Southeast Asia—Sino-Tibetan, Austro Thai, and Mon-Khmer 
(ADB 2012a, 55-57). These major families of languages can further be subdivided into 
numerous branches forming an important basis for distinguishing ethnic groups. While each 
ethnic group maintains distinct culture that is handed down to them by their ancestors, 
increasingly over time, many have been assimilated into mainstream national cultures moving 
to lower valleys or plains and adopting the mainstream language (ADB 2012a, 57-58).  
Despite such diversity in culture at subnational level, the great demand for GMS 
countries to achieve economic prosperity and development seem to bond the six countries 
together. Going through period of ideological conflict and war in the late 20th century, GMS 
countries learned maintaining cooperation allows them to benefit from the ‘peace dividend’. 
Thus, in general, GMS countries share the common vision and goal towards strengthening 
regional competitiveness. Perhaps a challenge that they ought to overcome in the near future 
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would be how to incorporate the ethnic minorities still living in remote areas and face 
problems of marginality, poverty, and lack of basic infrastructure. Ensuring equitable 
distribution of benefits through tourism sector development, for instance, is an ongoing effort 
by the ADB and member governments.  
 
C. Economic Structure 
 
In the early 1990s, the level of economic development, industry, and exports were 
more or less similar between the two regional communities (with an exception of Thailand) 
(see Table 6). While GMS countries did show slightly higher figures for value added in the 
industrial sector and share of exports than EAC countries, the gap was not starkly large. Both 
communities were mostly agricultural and non-export oriented economies (see Table 6 and 
Table 7). However, in the following two decades, the two regional communities diverged in 
their path of economic development. On average (and also individually), the GMS countries 
achieved higher growth rate compared to EAC countries (see Figure 4). Moreover, they 
transformed their economic structure through export-oriented industrialization departing from 
the extremely volatile primary goods-based economy. The rise in GDP per capita, exports of 
goods and services (Table 6), and large share of manufactures exports in GMS countries 
(Table 8) indicate such a transition. While EAC countries did show some change in their 
economic structure, it was not as evident as that of the GMS countries (also see Table 6, 7, 
and 8).  
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Table 6. GDP per capita, Industry, and Exports16 
Region Country 
GDP Per Capita 
(current US$) 
Industry, value added 
(% of GDP) 
Exports of goods and 
services (% of GDP) 
1992 2015 1992 2015 1992 2015 
GMS 
Cambodia 
253.2 
(1993) 
1158.7 
13.0 
(1993) 
29.4 
16.1 
(1993) 
67.6 
China 
Yunnan 293 4658 
43.0 40.5 17.3 22.4 
Guangxi 268 5650 
Lao PDR 250.8 1812.3 17.8 30.9 17.0 34.8 
Myanmar N/A 1203.5 9.4 N/A 1.4 N/A 
Thailand 1929.5 5816.4 38.1 
36.9 
(2014) 
37.0 
69.3  
(2014) 
Vietnam 144.1 2111.1 27.3 33.3 34.7 89.8 
EAC 
Burundi 183.7 276.0 21.2 16.7 8.7 7.1 
Kenya 328.0 1376.7 18.4 19.5 26.3 15.8 
Rwanda 302.3 697.3 18.7 14.2 5.6 14.4 
Tanzania 174.0 864.9 16.2 25.9 12.4 20.8 
Uganda 153.9 675.6 13.2 20.4 8.8 17.5 
Source: World Development Indicators; ADB 2012b 
 
 
Table 7. Agriculture 
Region Country 
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 
1992 2015 
GMS 
Cambodia 46.5 (1993) 28.2 
China 21.4 9.0 
Lao PDR 61.8 27.2 
Myanmar 60.5 N/A 
Thailand 12.3 10.5 (2014) 
Vietnam 33.9 17.0 
EAC 
Burundi 53.5 42.9 
Kenya 28.7 32.9 
Rwanda 33.2 32.7 
Tanzania 48.0 30.5 
Uganda 51.1 24.7 
Source: World Development Indicators 
 
                                           
16 Due to difficulty in obtaining data, national figures were used for Chinese industry and exports section. 
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region joined the GMS in 2004. Burundi and Rwanda joined the EAC in 2007. 
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Figure 4. Average Growth Rate17 
 
Source: Data from World Development Indicators 
 
Table 8. Composition of Exports  
Region Country 
Manufactures exports 
(% of merchandise 
exports, 2014) 
Food exports (% of 
merchandise 
exports, 2014) 
Ores and metals 
exports (% of 
merchandise exports, 
2014) 
GMS 
Cambodia 94.0 3.4 0.2 
China 94.0 2.7 1.3 
Lao PDR N/A N/A N/A 
Myanmar 30.0 (2010) 19.6 (2010) 0.9 (2010) 
Thailand 76.3 13.7 1.3 
Vietnam 76.3 14.8 0.7 
EAC 
Burundi 24.2 72.1 3.3 
Kenya 36.9 (2013) 46.2 (2013) 2.2 
Rwanda 12.3 36.9 46.5 
Tanzania 18.9 57.8 17.4 
Uganda 25.6 65.5 0.6 
Source: World Development Indicators 
 
The two regional communities also showed difference in intra-regional trade 
development. Since one of the goals of forming a regional community is to maximize the 
                                           
17 For Yunnan and Guangxi province, Chinese national figure was used. 
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benefits deriving from intra-regional trade, it serves as an indicator for assessing the 
effectiveness of the integration. As shown in figure 5 and 6, the share of intra-regional trade 
in both communities are not large. However, particularly in the recent years, the amount and 
the share of intra-regional trade greatly increased in GMS countries while the same figures 
remained rather stagnant for the EAC.    
 
Figure 5. Intra-EAC Trade 
 
Source: Data from EAC Trade Report 2013 
Figure 6. Intra-GMS Trade 
 
Source: Data from ‘GMS Statistics on Growth, Infrastructure, and Trade’, ADB 2016 
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As discussed earlier, cross-border transport infrastructures reduce the time and cost of 
trade. Thus, it can be argued that effective transport integration contributes to export-oriented 
industrialization and rise in intra-regional trade. However, while both communities strived to 
provide cross-border transport infrastructures, the degree of change in their economic 
structures were quite unequal. This paper conjectures that differing regionalism drivers 
played a role in this regard. Further discussion will be made in the later section of this paper.    
 
D. History and Country Relations 
 
Since general history and country relations in the two regional communities were 
already discussed, this part will deal with the historical evolution of the transport sector and 
how the regionalism drivers are reflected in it. First, in the case of EAC, cross-border 
cooperation for transport had colonial roots. The major mode of transportation at that time 
was railways built by the Germans and the British rather than road transport. In 1947, the 
British colonial and trustee governments established the East African Railways and Harbours 
Corporation (EARH) to coordinate maritime, terrestrial, and lake trade between Kenya, 
Uganda, and Tanganyika (Mathieson 2016, 28). The EARH ran the ports of Mombasa and 
Dar es Salaam, ports of Lake Victoria, and the railways in all three countries (Brenton and 
Hoffman 2016, 131-132). It is known that EARH operated similar to a private company 
financing the maintenance from its own revenue and relatively free from government control 
(Brenton and Hoffman 2016, 131-132). The collapse of the first EAC dismantled EARH and 
the three governments divided it into five organizations all under the control of each 
government including budget allocations (Kenya Rail, Tanzania Rail, Uganda Rail, Kenya 
Ports Authority, and Tanzania Ports Authority) (Brenton and Hoffman 2016, 131-132). The 
subsequent economic and political instabilities in the region, mainly caused by the tension 
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between Uganda and Tanzania, led to underinvestment in railways and lake ports eventually 
resulting in severe deterioration of those infrastructures (Brenton and Hoffman 2016, 131-
132).  
As EAC returned in the late 1990s, the EAC Treaty emphasized “the need for 
coordinated, harmonized, and complimentary transport and communications policies” along 
with further improving physical connectivity. This time the governments in the region chose 
to focus more on road transport over railways reflecting the expanding traffic and the 
growing power of trucking firms in Kenya and Tanzania. Railways regained attention by the 
late 2000s (2009 Railways Master Plan). Yet, currently, controversies rage over the 
endorsement of standard gauge railway initiative which is officially rejected by the Master 
Plan but is being carried out by the governments along the Northern Corridor (Mathieson 
2016, 26).18 In 2010, the EAC adopted ‘2010-15 EAC Transport Strategy’ that had no less 
than 247 projects worth US $21 billion (Mathieson 2016, 25). While the strategy laid out 
criteria for selecting priority projects, actual choices by governments are expected to be 
dependent on the availability of finance and their respective interests (Mathieson 2016, 25).  
The history of regional integration suggests that EAC emerged from ‘realist-liberal’ 
drivers for regionalism. This is strongly reflected in the evolution of the cross-border 
transport cooperation explained above. While the region as a whole cooperated to set 
comprehensive plans and strategies, they are being executed in a fragmented and 
uncoordinated manner as epitomized by the Kenyan government’s independent decision to 
carry out the standard gauge railway project with China. Lack of neutral coordination and the 
exertion of influence by the regional hegemon seem to affect national governments’ decisions 
to prioritize transport infrastructure projects selectively.  
                                           
18 Recently, Keya has entered into a $4 billion bilateral contract with China for the construction of new standard 
gauge railway (Chinese Exim Bank will finance 90% of the railway) that connects Mombasa and Nairobi 
(Brenton and Hoffman 2016, 127; Mathieson 2016, 6). 
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As for the GMS, the consultation between ADB and six member countries led the 
cooperation and planning process for improving transport linkages. From the outset, before 
the first ministerial meeting in October 1992, a study team of ADB visited each of the 
countries to identify potential areas for sub-regional cooperation and including 7 prioritized 
road projects in the case of transport (Ishida and Isono 2012, 2-3). Similar process took place 
before the second ministerial conference in August 1993 where the member countries agreed 
on five principles for project selection, prioritization, and design especially focusing on the 
transport sector (Ishida and Isono 2012, 5-6).19 Following the conference, ADB and the 
consultants prepared 33 transport projects reflecting the results of the conference and 
continued discussions from them (Ishida and Isono 2012, 7). After the 4th ministerial 
conference, feasibility studies and engineering studies of cross-border transport infrastructure 
projects began to develop (Ishida and Isono 2012, 10).  
These efforts culminated in the formulation of the Transport Master Plan by the ADB 
in 1995. And in 1998, the Transport Master Plan was updated to incorporate the ‘(economic) 
corridor’ concept that aimed at gaining an ‘initial explosive’ effect amid the rising fear of 
stagnation due to the Asian Financial Crisis (ADB 2014, 3; Ishida and Isono 2012, 10-11). 
Three main corridors, known as the flagship corridors, were identified: North-South, East-
West, and Southern. The Master Plan was further updated in 2003 when all member countries 
finished signing the Cross-Border Transport Agreement (CBTA) for streamlining regulations 
and reducing nonphysical barriers in GMS. In 2006, the ADB published its first 
comprehensive GMS transport infrastructure assessment, Transport Sector Strategy (TSS) 
2006-2015, based on its technical assistance (TA) in 2004 (ADB 2014, 3). Among more than 
150 projects it examined, ADB prioritized 36 projects (road, railway, airport, and water 
transport projects) and almost all of them have been completed as of 2014 (ADB 2014, 5-6). 
                                           
19 For the full list of prioritized projects and the agreed five principles, see Ishida and Isono (2012) pp2-7.  
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Later in 2008, another list of prioritized projects was adopted by the 3rd GMS Summit, known 
as the Vientiane Plan of Action (VPOA), which also resulted from the consultations by and 
among GMS countries with ADB acting as the Secretariat (ADB 2014, 5-6). While most of 
its 44 projects suffered lack of implementation due to rise in estimated costs and difficulty in 
financing, the projects were considered manageable in number and well-distributed among 
GMS countries (ADB 2014, 5-6). The most recent plan is the Regional Investment 
Framework (RIF) 2013-2022 adopted at the 19th ministerial conference which is a pipeline of 
new projects that seek for future implementation. 
The planning and implementation of transport infrastructure projects in the GMS 
were carried out by continuous consultations between the ADB and the GMS member 
countries. Unlike the EAC, transport plans were created based on consultations and TA from 
the ADB and were adopted at a formal meeting, such as the ministerial conference or the 
summit meeting. In other words, the ADB played a vital role in coordinating and providing a 
vision for balanced development of the sub-region. Like the EAC, however, full 
implementation of the projects also remains as a large challenge for GMS countries. Yet, such 
concerns are more associated with financing difficulties rather than fragmented executions of 
the transport plan.  
 
VI. INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS 
 
As mentioned earlier, institutions are ‘rules of the game’ or arrangements that shape 
the political economic processes in policy-making and policy implementation. In the cross-
regional context, formal institutions can be viewed as regional frameworks or procedures that 
shape the regional decision-making and policy implementation process. Informal institutions, 
on the other hand, can be seen as norms, values, or informal practices that exert influence 
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over regional decision-making and policy implementation. 
 
A. Formal Institutions 
 
Policy-making and implementation in the EAC are largely shaped by three major 
formal institutions: the Summit, the Council of Ministers (Council), and the East African 
Legislative Assembly (EALA). The Summit comprises of Heads of Government of Partner 
States and is responsible for strategic direction towards the realization of the goal and 
objectives of the Community. The Council of Ministers, usually abbreviated as the Council, is 
the central decision-making and governing organ of the EAC that constitutes Ministers or 
Cabinet Secretaries from the Partner States who are responsible for regional cooperation. The 
Council meets biannually prior to the meeting of the Summit. Regulations, directives and 
decisions taken or given by the Council are binding to the Partner States and to all other 
organs of the EAC other than the Summit. The East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) is 
the legislative organ of the Community comprising of 45 elected Members (nine from each 
Partner State) and 7 ex-officio Members consisting of the Minister or Cabinet Secretary 
responsible for EAC Affairs from each Partner State, the Secretary-General, and the Counsel 
to the Community. The members serve the position for five years.20 
While the formal institutions in the EAC are seemingly well-designed to carry out the 
functions of the regional community, the reality reveals that the power distributed among the 
three organs are skewed towards the Council and the Summit that are composed of national 
politicians, rather than EALA that consists of member state representatives (Mathieson 2016, 
12). The Council often bypasses EALA procedures by including implementation plans, which 
are generally Acts that need to be voted by the EALA, in Protocols that translate EAC Treaty 
                                           
20 For more detailed explanation on the EAC organs see EAC homepage http://www.eac.int/about/organs.   
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principles into specific policies (Mathieson 2016, 12). Moreover, the Council significantly 
influences the EALA through its power to determine terms of service and control disciplinary 
actions against them (EALA 2013). In addition to the EALA, it also controls the EAC 
Secretariat with its power to approve all appointments within it and all procurement it 
undertakes (Mathieson 2016, 12). Such practices have resulted in fragmented, national 
interest-led policy-making where national priorities proposed by respective member states’ 
politicians are packaged as regional agendas (Mathieson 2016, 11-12). For instance, the EAC 
Industrialization Policy adopted in 2012 focused on specific states in developing SMEs and 
the manufacturing sector without coordinating the comparative advantages of member states 
that could better produce economic prosperity (EAC Secretariat 2012).  
In addition, non-state actors also engage in the regional policy-making process. Yet, 
their engagements through formal channels are very much limited. While the EALA 
mandated the Secretariat, national EAC ministries, the Council, and the sectoral committees 
to set regular consultation mechanisms with the civil society and private sector apex bodies, 
such as the East African Business Council (EABC) and the East African Civil Society 
Organizations Federation (EACSOF), those procedures are rarely carried out in practice 
(Mathieson 2016, 13-14). Rather, powerful regional private sector actors, namely the Kenya 
Association of Manufacturers (KAM), Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KePSA), exert 
influence by lobbying the high level politicians and bureaucrats. Their efforts are usually 
directed for infrastructure improvement and transport integration. Nevertheless, private sector 
engagements are not always constructive for the region since strong regional players, such as 
the Kenya Transport Association (KTA) or the Tanzania Transport Association (TATOA), 
often oppose to liberalize the sector in an attempt to maintain their monopoly (Mathieson 
2016, 13-14).   
In terms of implementation, the EAC Secretariat is considered to play an important 
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role in developing and implementing various policies. However, in reality, implementation 
and monitoring of EAC policies are left responsible for respective national ministries relevant 
to EAC affairs that usually lack the institutional capacity and political support (Mathieson 
2016, 14-15). Formal monitoring and evaluation system to oversee the Protocols and track 
expenditures and progresses on projects do not seem to be firmly established. Furthermore, 
while the East African Court of Justice (EACJ) is founded to ensure the compliance of each 
member states through penalties and sanctions, the organ is rarely used and its authority is 
secondary to national courts. Only 44 cases were concluded in the first decade of its 
establishment (Mathieson 2016, 15). 
This picture is not much different in relation to the transport sector since there exists 
no formal institution with delegated authority or technical staffs to support and coordinate 
EAC transport policies (Mathieson 2016, 34). While the EAC has made notable achievements 
in developing its transport infrastructures, especially along the Northern Corridor, 
harmonization of ‘soft infrastructure’ such as regulations, laws, standards, and customs face 
implementation challenges. For instance, the axle load debate between Kenya and Tanzania 
in determining the maximum weight a truck can carry continues to be a contentious matter. In 
2013, the EAC passed the Vehicle Load Control Bill which sets the permissible maximum 
gross vehicle weight at a metric tonnage of 56 and permits vehicles to have up to seven axles 
(Brenton and Hoffman 2016, 134). Yet, Kenya and Tanzania are interpreting the bill 
differently brining confusion to the transporters and the enforcement authorities. Also, the 
implementation of the East African Single Customs Territory, which allows transporters to 
pay customs for their final destination at port entry to reduce transit time, is confronting 
challenges (Brenton and Hoffman 2016, 136-137). While Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda have 
taken lead in setting up one-stop Electronic Single Window System (eSWS) for this process, 
various stakeholders are raising concerns over proper coordination under the customs 
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departments and lack of sufficient training of the freight forwarders to fully utilize the system 
(Brenton and Hoffman 2016, 136-137). Such challenges are not unique to the EAC but less 
coordinated policy-making and fragmented implementation seem to slow down regional 
integration.    
GMS is managed by institutional arrangements that involve both the political and 
operational levels of GMS members. Its formal institutions are structured in three levels: the 
Leaders' Summit, the Ministerial Conference, and the working group and forum in the nine 
priority sectors (see Figure 721). The Summit is the highest forum of the GMS Program, 
normally held every three years, where the GMS Leaders can “review and assess the progress 
made under the program; renew their commitment to subregional cooperation and its goals; 
provide support at the highest political level to the program, its projects, and activities; and 
provide broad directions for landmark or key initiatives under the GMS Program” (ADB 
2016). Under the Summits is the annual Ministerial Conference that “provides policy 
directions and oversees progress in identifying and implementing “results-oriented” 
subregional cooperation initiatives” (ADB 2016). Sectoral working groups carry out the 
detailed work necessary for the each priority sectors.  
 
                                           
21  The GMS Senior Official’s Meeting is usually considered a preparatory meeting for the Ministerial 
Conference.  
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Figure 7. GMS Institutional Arrangements 
 
Source: ADB 2009, 229 
 
Unlike the EAC, which is a treaty-based regional community subject to binding rules 
and regulations, the GMS involves “implicit or informal norms and understandings about the 
nature of acceptable behavior without any legal binding or enforcement capacity” (ADB 2009, 
119). In other words, compliance with agreed principles and policies in the GMS are largely 
voluntary. Yet, one point that GMS differs from the EAC is that the ADB operates as the de 
facto secretariat providing technical, administrative, financial, and logistical support (ADB 
2009, 138-139). For instance, by the end of 2013, among $16.6 billion in investment projects 
and $330.8 million in technical assistance the GMS program had mobilized, ADB’s support 
accounted for more than one-third of them amounting to $6.0 billion and $115.1 million 
respectively (ADB 2016). Furthermore, ADB services monitoring and evaluation on various 
projects in the nine priority sectors. Namely, the ADB and the ADB Institute (ADBI) publish 
reviews, reports, and discussion papers to continuously update and assess the impact of 
development projects in the region. Hence, despite the absence of enforcement mechanisms, 
the program still provides incentives and pressure for implementation under the coordination 
and support of the ADB.  
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In regards to transport, the GMS members rely on sectoral working groups mentioned 
above and the institutional frameworks established in accordance with the Cross-Border 
Transport Agreement (CBTA). CBTA is a compact and comprehensive multilateral 
instrument that covers issues ranging from single-stop/single-window customs inspections, 
the cross-border movement of people, requirements for vehicles making cross-border trips to 
road and bridge design standards, road signs, and signals (ADB 2009, 140). It aims to further 
increase and facilitate traffic and promote transport and trade facilitation beyond construction 
of physical infrastructure and was originally signed by Laos, Thailand, and Viet Nam in 1999. 
Cambodia later acceded to the agreement in 2001, followed by PRC in 2002, and Myanmar 
in 2003. The agreement came into force at the end of 2003 upon the ratification of six 
countries. The CBTA applies to selected and mutually agreed upon routes, as well as to points 
of entry and exit in the signatory countries (ADB 2009, 140). To coordinate the ratification 
and implementation of the CBTA and its annexes and protocols, senior officials from 
ministries and agencies involved in cross-border transport and trade facilitation comprise the 
National Transport Facilitation Committees (NTFCs). Respective NTFC members of the six 
GMS countries also comprise the various subcommittees of the CBTA including transport, 
customs, immigration, and quarantine and health (see Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8. Institutional Framework of the GMS CBTA 
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Source: ADB 2009, 229 
 
 The GMS has made great achievements in just a short few years considering that 
significant progress in Western Europe took decades (ADB 2011, 272). Establishment of 
“Fast Track” lanes along the East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC), inclusion of additional 
border crossings in the CBTA, and establishment and piloting of GMS Road Transport Permit 
System and the Customs Transit and Temporary Admission System (CTS) along the EWEC 
are some of notable achievements made in the past decade (ADB 2011, 273-275). Significant 
rise of intra-GMS trade from $79 billion in 2005 to $413 billion in 2014 suggests that 
implementation of CBTA was not all ineffective. Furthermore, the ADB, with the financial 
support of donor partners, has provided TA to accelerate the implementation of the agreement. 
For instance, according to a TA completion report by ADB in 2012, a number of workshops, 
field visits, and various capacity-building training programs on transport and trade facilitation 
were conducted for central government, border officials, provincial authorities, and even the 
private sector. Such interventions have contributed to realizing the plans of the agreement. 
While GMS also faces numerous implementation challenges, they mainly derive from 
difficulty in financing, underestimated costs, or severe domestic political instabilities (e.g. 
Myanmar). The type of rivalry or tension seen in the EAC, as for the case between Kenya and 
Tanzania, and fragmented implementation of policies are less witnessed in the GMS.   
In addition to the various institutional arrangements, the GMS Business Forum 
promotes private investment in GMS countries. The GMS has also made good progress in 
involving the private sector. For instance, national chambers of commerce participate in GMS 
programs (ADB 2009, 141-142). And more recently, the GMS Freight Transport Association 
(FRETA), a regional coalition of carriers, freight forwarders, logistics associations and 
individual companies that are interested in facilitating and developing trade and transport in 
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the GMS, was established as part of the GMS-Business Forum. Its office in Vientiane hosted 
its first General Annual meeting on 31 October 2012. The GMS Transport and Trade 
Facilitation Forum and the ADB also support their activity.  
 
B. Informal Institutions 
 
While the influence of informal institutions (norms, values, and informal practices) in 
development cannot be overlooked, they are extremely difficult to analyze and compare as 
they build over long period of time and often originate from complicated historical and 
cultural backgrounds. Since reviewing all of them is not the main objective of this paper, 
informal institutions critical to development, namely patronage and corruption, will be 
discussed in this section.  
Patronage and corruption appear in both regional communities and influence the 
development of cross-border transport infrastructure and trade. In the case of EAC, politically 
powerful trucking firms of Kenya and Tanzania, based on their connections with the president, 
have pushed for improvement of regional road networks rather than infrastructures for other 
modes of transportation. For example, the former president of Kenya, Daniel Moi, and 
Tanzania, Jakaya Kikwete, have family members running large trucking companies that have 
strong incentives to construct and rehabilitate roads (Brenton and Hoffman 2016, 132). Also, 
the strong alliance between powerful political elites and small group of business interests 
challenge the implementation of EAC policies through lengthy delays and blockages when 
they find those policies are against their interests. In Kenya, the top political elites are closely 
connected to tribally segmented business interests that finance their rise and in turn receive 
patronage once those leaders are in power (Burges et al. 2009). In Rwanda, the ruling 
Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) maintains important business interests through its large 
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holdings companies (Byiers et al. 2015). Such practices of patronage have limited the 
implementation of customs union and elimination of non-tariff barriers. Moreover, 
corruptions rising from bribery and rent extraction among police, custom agents, politicians, 
and powerful private groups at ports and various custom check points have negatively 
impacted development of trade in the EAC. According to a survey conducted in 2012, “86% 
of transporters in Kenya, 82% in Tanzania, and 55% in Uganda admitted making informal 
payments to those groups in the course of transporting goods” (TMEA 2012).  
While direct connection to transport and trade seems less evident, patronage and 
corruption are also prevalent in the GMS. Historically, Thailand has been overwhelmed with 
patronage politics where vote-buying and skewed resource allocation to patronage networks 
were rampant. Countries such as Myanmar face problem of poor corporate governance in 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that are largely held and managed by military officials. 
Cumbersome procedures for starting and maintaining businesses in Cambodia and Laos raise 
the risk of bribery and corruption to expedite the process. Furthermore, lack of awareness 
towards corruption among border agencies in the GMS not only raises the cost of 
transportation and trade but also the risk of smuggling and transnational crime. For instance, 
when border control officials were asked whether or not there are rules on receiving presents 
at their border section and if they had received training on these rules, the vast majority of 
respondents from Thailand and Cambodia said that there are no such rules, and only 50% 
respondents from Vietnam answered yes (UNODC 2013). For Laos and Myanmar, while 
most of them answered that clear rules exist, only 2.4% Lao officials and 28.3% of Myanmar 
officials responded that they have actually received training on those rules (UNODC 2013). 
Since most evidences are anecdotal and suggestive, the corruption perceptions index 
(CPI) published by Transparency International perhaps provide a clearer picture of patronage 
and corruption in both regions. The CPI reveals that the perceived level of corruption is more 
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or less similar between the two regions with an exception of Rwanda (see Table 9). The broad 
picture is also not much different when looking at the percentile rank of control of corruption 
in World Governance Indicator 22  although GMS countries do show slightly better 
performance.  
 
Table 9. Corruption Indices 2015 – GMS vs. EAC 
Region Country 
Corruption Perceptions Index 2015 Control of 
Corruption: 
Percentile Rank 
2015 (0=lowest 
rank, 100=highest 
rank) 
Ranking Score 
GMS 
Cambodia 150 21 12.5 
China 83 37 50.0 
Lao PDR 139 25 19.7 
Myanmar 147 22 16.8 
Thailand 76 38 43.8 
Vietnam 112 31 39.4 
EAC 
Burundi 150 21 10.1 
Kenya 139 25 13.5 
Rwanda 44 54 75.0 
Tanzania 117 30 25.5 
Uganda 139 25 12.0 
Source: Data from Transparency International, World Governance Indicators 
 
VII. AGENTS (KEY ACTORS) 
 
Various agents shape the process of regional development cooperation. In the EAC, 
above all, Kenya and Tanzania are the major players that exercise influence over regional 
integration. Yet, they maintain differing views on the EAC. On one hand, Kenya strongly 
pushes for accelerated integration despite the disproportionate costs it has to bear as the lead 
government. As mentioned earlier, Kenya benefits more from the integration since it 
dominates intra-EAC trade with its primary and secondary goods. The average share of 
                                           
22 Control of corruption indicator “captures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests 
(World Governance Indicators).” 
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Kenya’s exports in intra-EAC exports between 2010 and 2013 was 52% followed by 
Tanzania (20%) and Uganda (19%) (Mathieson 2016, 10-11). Hence, it has been most active 
in implementing EAC policies and integration such as improving efficiency of the Mombasa 
Port, constructing the Standard Gauge Rail (though it remains controversial), dealing with 
weighbridge and visa issues, and rehabilitating roads (Mathieson 2016, 18-19). On the other 
hand, Tanzania, the second largest power in the region, competes with Kenya over the 
regional market. This competition has created a geopolitical clash between the informal 
grouping of Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania. Between late 2013 and 2014 when the 
informal group of three countries functioned as an alternative policy forum, Tanzania refused 
to sign an EAC Council of Minister’s report on political integration expressing its discontents 
with the issue of land ownership and military cooperation (Mathieson 2016, 17). This 
symbolic incident explicitly show the reality of regional power politics and Tanzania’s 
preference towards shallow integration to contain the influence of Kenya.  
In the midst of regional power politics, the private sector has primarily driven 
transport sector development by placing pressure on the government. Group of transporters, 
logistics providers, and traders such as the Shippers’ Council of East Africa (SCEA), the 
Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA), and the East Africa Business Council (EABC) 
engaged in continuous lobbying efforts to push for reforms in the ports and roads including 
removing roadblocks and weighbridges (Brenton and Hoffman 2016, 136). Also, as addressed 
earlier, trucking firms in Kenya and Tanzania have pushed for transport infrastructure 
development using their close ties with political leaders. The Kenyan government, in 
particular, has been most receptive to private sector interests by assisting Kenyan producers 
to reach the regional market (Brenton and Hoffman 2016, 6-7). However, because of limited 
formal channels to the EAC, lobbying efforts were carry out by few powerful organizations 
and concentrated at national high level political leaders.  
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 Another important actor in relation to transport and other sector policies is the EAC 
Secretariat. Yet, while the EAC Secretariat is considered to play a significant role in 
developing and implementing various policies, it does not have any delegated authority nor 
the required expertise and technical staffs to coordinate transport infrastructure. As a result, 
the Secretariat advises member states on transport policy based on studies carried out by 
third-party funded international consultants. For instance, the Transport Master Plan Study 
was undertaken by a Canadian consultancy and funded by the AfDB; the 2011 Transport 
Strategy and Road Sector Development Program was prepared by a Greek-Nigerian 
conglomerate Africon Ltd; and the Standard Gauge Railway feasibility study was carried out 
by Santa Fe Railways funded by USAID (Mathieson 2016, 34). In the absence of an 
empowered and capable Secretariat, these planning studies become an end in themselves 
insulated from the likelihood of actually being implemented (Mathieson 2016, 34). Moreover, 
a number of parallel transport infrastructure initiatives emerged, such as the Northern 
Corridors Initiative and Standard Gauge Rail, which the EAC has no control and mandate 
(Mathieson 2016, 34). In other words, national organs of member states take a leading role in 
these initiatives, rather than them being led by the Secretariat or EAC ministries.  
 International development partners are also heavily involved in the EAC. In 2013, 
traditional donors contributed over 65% of the 2013/14 budget of the EAC while member 
states just contributed 28% (EAC 2013). This reliance on donor funding creates significant 
incentives for the EAC to develop policies that appeal to donors in order to continue 
accessing funds (Mathieson 2016). Majority of funding is tied to specific projects, objectives, 
or conditions set by donors and more flexible forms of support only take up a very small 
share of the total budget (EAC 2013). In particular, heavy donor involvement in the EAC 
Secretariat, investment projects, and Trade Mark East Africa (TMEA)23, a not-for-profit 
                                           
23 “TMEA provides technical support to the EAC member states on transport infrastructural development and 
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organization funded by a range of development agencies, allows EAC transport sector 
priorities to be influenced by external donors. Hence, EAC agendas are often left less 
prioritized relative to other donor set policies or projects. And more recently, the rise of China 
as a development partner is changing the landscape of infrastructure development in the 
region. China invests billions of dollars in transport mega projects such as ports, roads, and 
railways as well as mining, energy, and housing. Yet, despite the Framework Agreement 
signed in 2011 between China and the EAC, Chinese infrastructure investments are 
negotiated at the national, not the EAC, level (EAC Secretariat 2011; Mathieson 2016, 37). 
As suggested earlier in the case of Standard Gauge Railway project between China and 
Kenya, regional transport infrastructure development is largely fragmented and the role of the 
EAC in regional transport policy advice and coordination remains marginal. 
 For GMS, the ADB, China, and Japan have been major players in the regional 
cooperation process. As already reiterated multiple times in this paper, ADB played a vital 
role in facilitating GMS cooperation in various sectors by providing not only the institutional 
framework and financial resources but also technical assistance for capacity building. The 
transport sector, inter alia, accounted for majority of the lending and TA. In addition to the 
ADB, China, especially in the recent years, has increasingly become an influential player in 
the region. While key project of the GMS program has been EWEC to strengthen the east-
west axis for balanced development of GMS, one of the noticeable expansions within the 
GMS was the north-south axis which connects China with countries such as Vietnam, 
Thailand or Myanmar (Ogasawara 2011, 11). This can be reaffirmed by the fact that China’ 
trade with GMS countries skyrocketed from $1.6 billion in 1990 to $20.8 billion in 2011 
(Chen and Stone 2013, 8). The Yunnan Province has actively engaged in its economic 
relations with other members and currently, Kunming, its capital, became the core of 
                                                                                                                                   
trade facilitation while also financing some modest strategic investments, including port access roads, one stop 
border posts, and short stretches of road in key cross-border locations.” (TMEA 2014) 
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economic activities that reach into the bordering countries of Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, and 
beyond (Chen and Stone 2013, 8). The rising interest on GMS by the Chinese central 
government is also evident by the changes in the rank of Chinese representative in the 
ministerial meetings. At the initial stage it was lower rank central government officials and 
officials from Yunnan provincial government who participated in meetings. However, since 
the ministerial meeting held in 1995, the central government has begun to dispatch officials 
of higher rank. Then in 2002, the prime minister Zhu Rongji participated in the first summit, 
which fully appealed Chinaʼs active commitment to the GMS (Ogasawara 2011, 11). Today, 
the growing ambition for China’s ‘Go Southwest’ strategy to extend its economic interests 
and influence into Southeast Asia may perhaps reconfigure the driver for regionalism pf GMS 
in the near future.  
Japan has traditionally been a very influential player in East and Southeast Asia. In 
has been one of the largest donors to GMS countries, mainly Thailand and Vietnam. Also, 
even though the GMS was technically an ADB initiative, Japan’s position as the bank’s 
largest shareholder 24  assured its political economic influence over GMS cooperation. 
Working in consort with the ADB, Japan played a prominent role in moving Vietnam towards 
economic reform, Cambodia towards political reconciliation, and Laos towards basic self-
sufficiency (Hartley 2015, 5). It also organized working groups and forums to facilitate public 
and private investment in Mekong planned infrastructure (Hartley 2015, 5). Japan’s active 
engagement in the GMS is often viewed as extension of its foreign policy to harness 
economic benefits and exercise its leadership and even hegemony in the region (Cochrane 
2012; Hartley 2015). However, in the recent years, the rising role of China in the Mekong is 
telling that potential future tensions may result between the two big players in East Asia.  
 
                                           
24  Japan and the US hold the largest shares in ADB with 15.6% and 15.5% respectively. 
https://www.adb.org/site/investors/credit-fundamentals/shareholders accessed 8 JAN 2017.  
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VIII. FINDINGS IN DEVELOPMENTAL OUTCOME 
 
The findings from the comparative analysis above can be summarized as below (See 
Table 10).
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Table 10. PEA Summary 
Regional Community 
EAC  
(East African Community) 
GMS  
(Greater Mekong Sub-region) 
Driver for Regionalism Realist-Liberal Constructivist-Liberal 
PEA Variables 
Structure 
(Foundational Factors) 
Geography 
- Landlocked: Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda 
- Kenya (regional hegemon), Rwanda, Uganda vs. 
Tanzania  
→ asymmetric transport development (Northern 
Corridor vs. Central Corridor) 
- Landlocked: Lao PDR, Yunnan Province 
→ active commitment to GMS 
- Trust formed from cooperation around the Mekong 
River turned out as a valuable asset (Nam Ngum 
and Xeset hydroelectric project).  
Culture & Identity 
- Widespread use of the Kiswahili language 
- Post-colonial nation building, Pan-Africanism 
- Economic rationale over cultural, ethnical, 
linguistic diversity 
Economic Structure 
- Reliant on primary goods, less export-oriented 
except for Kenya  
- Stagnant growth of intra-EAC trade  
- Relatively successful export-oriented 
industrialization  
- Growing intra-GMS trade 
History &  
Country Relations 
(Transport Sector) 
- Selective prioritization of projects due to lack of 
neutral coordination (e.g. SG railway) 
- Continuous consultations between ADB and 
members countries on infrastructure development 
Institution  
(Rules of the Game) 
Formal  
- Treaty-based, binding rules and regulations 
- EAC Summit, Council of Ministers, EALA, EACJ 
- Weakly capacitated and empowered EAC Secretariat 
- Voluntary compliance 
- GMS Summit, Ministerial Meeting, Sectoral 
Working Groups 
- ADB as the de facto secretariat  
- CBTA 
Informal  - Patronage and corruption - Patronage and corruption 
Agents Key Actors 
- Kenya, Tanzania + Private Sector (esp. in Kenya) 
- EAC Secretariat  
- International Donors + China 
- ADB 
- China 
- Japan 
Source: Organized by the author 
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Modified PEA reveals two prominent features in regional cooperation and cross-
border infrastructure development in the two regional communities. First, the implementation 
of regional transport policies is more fragmented and asymmetric in the EAC than in the 
GMS. As explained throughout the analysis, the development of transport infrastructure was 
less balanced in the EAC where the Northern Corridor, including the port of Mombasa, 
improved greater than the Central Corridor and the port of Dar es Salaam. While similar 
issues can also be observed for GMS in the rapid expansion of the north-south axis linking 
China and other GMS countries, they are less conspicuous compared to that of the EAC. 
Moreover, selective prioritization of infrastructure projects in the EAC, as epitomized in the 
case of the controversial construction of the Standard Gauge Railway led by Kenya and 
China, add to the fragmented cross-border transport development. In the GMS, transport 
policies and plans were carried out in a relatively coordinated manner with the assistance of 
ADB. 
Such a divergence in two regional communities is attributable to the difference in 
regionalism drivers and the absence of an effective coordinator with strong authority and the 
capacity. In the EAC, realist-liberal driver for regionalism centered on Kenya and the lack of 
expertise and authority of the EAC Secretariat supported the fragmented implementation of 
transport policies. GMS countries, on the other hand, enjoyed the benefit of technical and 
financial assistance of the ADB. The case of EAC and GMS show that differing dynamics 
and developmental outcome could take place depending on the regionalism drivers and 
existence of an effective coordinator.  
The second feature which stands out is the changes in economic structure, growth, 
and intra-regional trade. As noted in the beginning, numerous literatures attest that 
development of cross-border infrastructures promotes growth, alleviates poverty, and reduces 
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costs in trade. Hence, the differences in the economic structure and growth between the two 
regional communities eventually reflect their level of cross-border infrastructure development. 
As explained earlier, GMS countries outperformed the EAC in terms of average growth, 
intra-regional trade, and the transition of the economy through export-oriented 
industrialization. A glance of this result seem to suggest that the overall development of 
cross-border transport infrastructure has been more successful in the GMS.  
Interestingly, however, the overall logistics performance and the quality of physical 
infrastructure is more or less similar between the two regional communities (see Table 11 and 
12). Indeed, the EAC countries have shown greater improvements in the LPI rankings than 
the GMS countries in the recent years (also see Table 11 and 12). Yet, a deeper look inside 
their performance in relation to trade throws another picture. Table 13 explicitly show that 
time and cost to export in the GMS is much more favorable for export-oriented development 
than that of the EAC. These results suggest that not only ‘hard infrastructures’ such as ports, 
railways, highways, and border facilities but also ‘soft infrastructures’ such as transport laws, 
regulations, and organizational systems and their proper implementation are extremely 
important to harness the full benefits of cross-border transport infrastructure development. 
While measuring the exact impact of soft infrastructures on trade requires rigorous empirical 
testing, it is reasonable to conjecture that, for the EAC, fragmented implementation of 
transport policies and asymmetric infrastructure development have inhibited the positive 
impact of cross-border infrastructures. It can be said that the GMS, while institutionally 
shallower, has made more progress in providing and utilizing transport infrastructure for 
achieving economic objectives (e.g. intra-regional trade).  
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Table 11. Logistics Performance Index (LPI) Global Ranking – Overall 2007 vs. 2016 
Region Country LPI, Overall (2007) LPI, Overall (2016) 
GMS 
Cambodia 81 73 
China 30 27 
Lao PDR 117 152 
Myanmar 147 113 
Thailand 31 45 
Vietnam 53 64 
EAC 
Burundi 113 107 
Kenya 76 42 
Rwanda 148 62 
Tanzania 137 61 
Uganda 83 58 
Source: World Development Indicators 
 
Table 12. Logistics Performance Index (LPI) Global Ranking – Infrastructure 2007 vs. 2016  
Region Country LPI, Infrastructure (2007) LPI, Infrastructure (2016) 
GMS 
Cambodia 81 99 
China 30 23 
Lao PDR 120 155 
Myanmar 145 105 
Thailand 31 46 
Vietnam 60 70 
EAC 
Burundi 62 147 
Kenya 100 42 
Rwanda 148 76 
Tanzania 122 60 
Uganda 99 67 
Source: World Development Indicators 
 
Table 13. Time and Cost to Export 
Region Country 
Average time to 
clear exports 
through customs  
(days, latest 
available year) 
Time to export (day, 
2014) 
Cost to export  
(US$ per container, 
2014) 
GMS 
Cambodia 2 (2013) 22 795 
China 7.6 (2012) 21 823 
Lao PDR 5.6 (2012) 23 1950 
Myanmar 4.4 (2014) 20 620 
Thailand 1.3 (2006) 14 595 
Vietnam 4.1 (2009) 21 610 
EAC 
Burundi 20.6 (2014) 32 2905 
Kenya 10.3 (2013) 26 2255 
Rwanda 10.2 (2011) 26 3245 
Tanzania 12.4 (2013) 18 1090 
Uganda 10 (2013) 28 2800 
Source: World Development Indicators 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
 
Using international relations theories, political economy analysis, and descriptive 
statistics, this paper examined two regional communities that display differing features in 
regional development cooperation. By providing a comparative case study of cross-border 
transport infrastructure development, it revealed how the diverging regionalism drivers have 
affected the dynamics and the political economy that shape infrastructure development. It 
also suggested how these features connect to different developmental outcomes, especially in 
relations to trade. Yet, the causal relationship between regionalism drivers, soft infrastructure, 
and trade remains to be corroborated as an area of further empirical research. Moreover, this 
research has limitations in that it mostly used secondary data and lacked analysis on the 
integration of the two regional communities to other trade-hubs. For instance, GMS countries 
definitely gained much from being integrated to the global value chain of industrialized East 
Asian countries such as China, Japan, and South Korea. Nevertheless, this paper contributes 
to the existing literature by illustrating the historical evolution of two regional communities 
and how their diverging cooperation dynamics affected provision of public goods such as 
cross-border transport infrastructure. 
While the explanations in this paper help understand the historical progress of the 
two regional communities for the past few decades, it does not forecast that the current trend 
will continue. As briefly discussed above, the rise of Chinese influence in the GMS and its 
potential tensions with Japan (and possibly other GMS countries) may alter the regionalism 
dynamics (for instance, a realist-liberal driver centered on China). Depending on the changes 
it will bring, development cooperation in the GMS may confront challenges or issues that 
have not been so much problematic in the past. Sustained efforts to keep up with the changes 
in regional order will help paint a more accurate picture of regional development cooperation 
in the near future.  
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